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Abstract—This paper proposes a proximity-aware extensions
to the current Bitcoin protocol, named Master Node Based
Clustering (MNBC). The ultimate purpose of the proposed
protocol is to evaluate the security and performance of group-
ing nodes based on physical proximity. In MNBC protocol,
physical internet connectivity increases as well as the number
of hops between nodes decreases through assigning nodes
to be responsible for propagating based on physical internet
proximity.
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1. Introduction
having control over the network as there is no node that
would have a full knowledge of the entire network topology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, related work in measuring and analysing Bitcoin infor-
mation propagation and in modelling approaches to avoid
double spending attacks will be outlined. Section 3 details
the proposed clustering protocols MNBC with reference to
the clusters generation and clusters maintenance. In Section
4, performance evaluation of the proposed clustering proto-
cols regarding speeding up the transaction propagation delay
are performed. Section 5 evaluates the potential of partition
attacks in the proposed protocol. We conclude the work in
Section 6.
2. Related Work
Measurements of the probability of double spending
attacks based on measurements in the real Bitcoin network
have been provided in [1] through developing an analytical
model of the Bitcoin system. A model that considers some
modifications in the transaction dissemination protocol in
the Bitcoin network has been presented in [5]. The core idea
of this model is that a node can add a received transaction
to its pool and forwarded it to other nodes if the received
transaction has not been seen before. Otherwise, the node
directly forwards the transaction to other neighbours without
adding it to its pool. This scenario allows a fake transaction
to be received by the node that issues the original transac-
tion. Though, the initiator node would immediately detect
the attempted of a double spending attack when the fake
transaction is received. The most serious disadvantage of this
method is that a large volume of nonessential traffic would
flood the network which results in inefficient performance
of the Bitcoin network.
As introduced in [2], faster information propagation
can be achieved by pipelining information dissemination in
order to minimize the round-trip times between nodes and
their neighbours. This solution claims that incoming INV
message which includes a list of hashes of the available
transactions, can be immediately forwarded instead of wait-
ing to receive transactions. Therefore, nodes can ask for a
transaction even though it has not arrived yet. On receiving
the transaction, it will be forwarded immediately for nodes
As the Bitcoin network topology is not proximity de-
fined, c onnecting t o o ther p eers i s m aintained randomly 
without considering any proximity criteria. In other words, 
long-distance links are not taken into consideration when the 
Bitcoin physical network topology is built. This increases 
non-compulsory hops that the information passes through. 
In addition, as it is mentioned in [1], the sheer distance 
between the origin of a transaction or block and other nodes 
is deemed as the most significant problem in the Bitcoin net-
work. As a result, transaction verification process i s slower 
[2]. Hence, the potential of double spending attacks, that are 
more difficult to discover in a slow network, increases due to 
the conflict between nodes regarding the transactions history. 
Uncertainty regarding the validity of a given transaction 
causes the blockchain forks where a transaction can appear 
in two different branches of the blockchain [3].
Therefore, the propagation delay between nodes in the 
Bitcoin network is critical even though the probability of 
reaching an agreement about transaction history is high [4]. 
Aiming at evaluating security and performance of proximity 
based clustering in the Bitcoin network thereby reduce the 
possibility of double spending attacks, this paper proposes 
and implements a clustering protocol, named as Master 
Node Based Clustering (MNBC). MNBC protocol relies 
on several nodes, known as master nodes, to achieve fully 
connected clusters based on the physical Internet proximity 
and random peers selection. MNBC is implemented in a 
distributed manner where all nodes contribute in achieving 
a proximity based network layout. This prevents any node
that have asked for it, considering that a GETDATA message
has already been received from those nodes. By doing this,
the idle time in which nodes are normally waiting for the
GETDATA message to arrive, would be utilized. However,
we believe that this theory might reduce the propagation
delay with a very low rate as the transaction still needs to
pass through random and unlocalized connections to visit
most of the Bitcoin network nodes. Another change has
been proposed in the same study that is closely related to
what we are presenting in this paper. This change increases
the geographical connectivity in Bitcoin network through
several coordinator nodes, distributed strategically around
the globe. These nodes are able to search and suggest
Bitcoin network nodes to each other. The main downside
of this solution is that it is relatively centralized.
3. Master Node Based Clustering Protocol:
Concept and Implementation
Master Node Based Clustering protocol (MNBC) ex-
tends the BCBSN protocol that was proposed in our previous
work [6], with the aim of addressing security and perfor-
mance limitations of BCBSN protocol. As it is mentioned
in [6], the BCBSN protocol aims to generate a set of
geographically diverse clusters in the Bitcoin network by
exploiting super peers technology. Within each cluster, the
BCBSN protocol assigns one node to be a super peer that
is responsible for maintaining the cluster and broadcasting
information in the Bitcoin network. In the BCBSN protocol,
clusters are fully connected via super peers only. Due to
this, the information flow between clusters in the BCBSN
protocol is only fulfilled through super peers. Furthermore,
super peers in the BCBSN protocol group peers based on
their geographical location in order to increase the proximity
of connectivity in the network. However, long-link distance
might be applied between any two peers even though they
are in the same geographical location. The node selection in
BCBSN protocol is not random, instead, the node is forced
to connected to the list of nodes that supplied by the super
peer that the node connects to. From a security point of view,
the level of security awareness in the BCBSN protocol can
be improved if more nodes between clusters are maintained
as well as random selections of peers which is important in
the Bitcoin network is preserved. This improves the network
resistance against the partitioning attack as well as eclipse
attack.
The limitations of BCBSN protocol mentioned above
have motivated the development of a Master Node Based
Clustering(MNBC) which relies on several nodes, known
as master nodes, to achieve fully connected clusters based
on the physical Internet proximity and random peers selec-
tion. The idea of the MNBC protocol is inspired by the
Master node technology that was originally adopted in [7].
However, master nodes in Darkcoin were responsible only
for propagating the network information to the majority of
nodes without taking into account whether or not those
nodes are close.
3.1. Master Node Selection
Master node role requires gaining a score which is
calculated based on how much each node burns bitcoins
and how long a node has been online. The main advantage
of this approach is that, impersonation of a master node
by a malicious node would be challenging. Therefore, this
score helps in electing master nodes that are better suited
for that role. To To incentivize nodes to compete towards
winning the master node’s role, as it has proven in [8], a
reward is given for a master node when it propagates a valid
transaction and behaves honestly. When a particular node
achieves the best score over other nodes in the network,
as it is illustrated in Algorithm 1, the node is elected as a
master node.
Algorithm 1: Master node score calculation algo-
rithm
Let M as: Master nodes set in the network
Let z as : Best master node score to achieve
1 while M 6= 0 do
2 for master node in M do
3 n← masternode.CalculateScore()
4 if n > z then
5 z = n
6 winning − node← masternode
7 Exit()
8 end
9 end
10 end
When a particular peer wants to occupy the role of
master nodes, the peer invites other peers that connect to
it by propagating two types of messages a masterINV
and an AcceptINV . Consider a node M decides to be a
master node and a peer P receives a masterINV from M .
On receiving of the masterINV message, as illustrated in
Algorithm 2, the node P accepts M ′s invitation if it finds
the node M to be closer in the physical internet and has
a bigger weight than the master node that P is connected
to. The node P decides whether or not M is close in the
physical internet by calculating the internet distance based
on ping latencies, following the same methodology that has
been adopted in [9] to measure the physical internet distance
between peers. The node P accepts M ′s invitation by
sending AcceptINV . The node P should keep forwarding
the masterINV to all its connected nodes which in turn
will propagate the masterINV further.
3.2. Cluster Maintenance
In order to increase the network resistance to eclipse
attack or partition attack, peer selection in MNBC reserves
the idea of random selections of peers which is impor-
tant in the Bitcoin network. Specifically, peers in MNBC
protocol select other peers based on a combination of
factors of physical proximity (link latency) and random
Algorithm 2: On receiving masterINV do
Let M as : nearest master node() with Bigger
weight
Let mp as: current master node
1 if mp 6= M then
2 mp = M
3 connectTo (mp)
4 Forward (masterINV )
5 else
6 Do Nothing
7 Forward (masterINV )
8 end
selection. Let R{n0,n1, ...., ni−1} be a set of peers in the
Bitcoin network, where i is the number of total peers.
Let M{mp0,mp1, ...,mpj−1} be a set of master nodes,
where j is the number of master nodes and M ⊆ R,
Let mpl{mpl, b0, b1, ...., bk−1}, (l = 0, 1, ..., j − 1) and
k is the number of peers in the cluster, mpl be a set of
peers in the lth cluster. Therefore, we have mpl ⊆ R and
R = mp0 ∪ mp1 ∪ ... ∪ mpj−1. When a node z wants to
join the Bitcoin network, it first learns about the available
master nodes by contacting an arbitrary node T which
already have been learnt from DNS service. The node T
responds with a list of the master nodes it knows about in
the network. The node z selects a master node mpi such that
∀mpj ∈ M,distance(z,mpi) ≤ distance(z,mpj). Then,
the node z sends a JoiningRequest message to the selected
master node. Note that the distance is also calculated based
on the link latency, following the same methodology that
has been adopted in our previous work [9].
After that, the node z learns about the available Bitcoin
nodes from a list of DNS services, where a list of random
nodes is supplied. The node z calculates the distance to each
node in the supplied list in order to get its proximity ordering
based on a link latency threshold. This ordering would help
the node z to be directed to a specific cluster. After that,
the node z tries to connect to a node k which is the closest
node in the nodes list that is supplied by the DNS service.
However, the role of the DNS service stops once the node
z connects to the node k. Periodically, the node z discovers
other nodes in the network using the Bitcoin network nodes
discovery mechanism [5], where the discovered nodes are
the nodes that is supplied by either DNS or the normal
Bitcoin network nodes discovery mechanism. Then, the node
z finds out whether the discovered nodes are physically close
by following the physical distance calculation algorithm
mentioned in our previous work [9]. When the node z wants
to leave the network, it sends a disconnect message to its
master node, which requires no reply. Then, the node mpi
should update its nodes list automatically.
As mentioned before, clusters are fully connected by
their edge nodes and master nodes. Therefore, edge nodes
will be selected between every pair of clusters. Specifically,
let S = s1, s2, ..., sm and R= r1, r2....., rn represent two
clusters, and let [sb, rb] denote their border nodes, where
sb ∈ S and rb ∈ R, then for all other pairs of clus-
ters (such that si 6= sb, rj 6= rb, si ∈ S, rj ∈ R),
distance(si, rj) > distance(sb, rb). Note that distance(x, y)
represents the physical internet distance between the two
nodes x and y in the network.
4. Performance Evaluation
The information propagation delay is considered as the
main performance metric in the evaluation of the proposed
protocol. We simulate our solution on an event based sim-
ulator that has been built in [6]. we designed an event-
based simulation model that is based on Bitcoin protocol
specification and measurements of real Bitcoin network.
Integration of the Bitcoin protocol based on Bitcoin client
behavior(bitcoind) as well as measurement of the conditions
in the real Bitcoin network are modelled in order to make
the simulator behave as closely to the real Bitcoin network
as possible. Measurements of link latencies between peers
in the real Bitcoin network, which were collected in our
previous work [6], are fixed in the simulation model as
the information propagation delays are the main aspect that
we concentrate on which requires an accurate estimate of
link latencies between Bitcoin network peers. The expen-
sive cryptographic operations are abstracted in the proposed
model, aiming to allow full scale experiments of the Bitcoin
network.
4.1. Experiments setup
After getting some proximity based clusters in every
simulation scenario, normal Bitcoin simulator events will be
launched. Within the proposed protocol, we implemented a
measuring node c which is able to create a valid transac-
tion Tx and send it to one node of its connected nodes,
and then it tracks the transaction in order to record the
time by which each node of its connections announces the
transaction. In other words, the transaction is propagated
from node c to one connected node only. Then node c
records the latency by which all cs’ connected nodes would
receive the transaction. Suppose the client c has proximity
based connections (1,2,3,...., n), c propagates a transac-
tion at time T , and it is received by its connected nodes
at different times (T1, T2, T3, ..., Tn). The time differences
between the first transaction propagation and subsequent
receptions of the transaction by connected nodes were cal-
culated (∆tc,1, ...,∆tc,n) according to equation(1):
∆tc,n = Tn − Tc (1)
Where Tn>Tn−1>, ....., T2, T1. However, the latency is
determined by an average of approximately 1000 runs in
order to increase the accuracy of the collected latencies
which might be affected by several factors such as data
corruption and loss of connection.
The simulations were performed on a 2,6 GHz machine
equipped with 64 GB of main memory; simulation of 10
hours at real-world scale of around 7,000 peers required 29
hours of computation time and 22 GB of memory.
4.2. Results and discussions
The simulation results show that the proposed protocol
offers an improvement in propagation delay compared to the
Bitcoin protocol. Fig.1 compares the distributions of ∆tc,n
for the simulated Bitcoin protocol against the same distri-
butions that have been measured in the simulated proposed
protocol MNBC. In the figure, the number of connected
nodes represents the sequence of the random nodes that the
measuring node connects with at each run. Regarding the
comparison between the MNBC and Bitcoin protocol, the
Bitcoin protocol performs variances of delays, which have
been collected in our prior work [6], that grow linearly with
the number of connected nodes, whereas MNBC maintains
lower variances of delays regardless of the number of con-
nected nodes. The reduction of the transaction propagation
time variances in the proposed protocol has to do with the
fact that the Bitcoin network layout in which nodes connect
to other nodes without taking advantage of any proxim-
ity correlations results in a long communication link cost
measured by the distance between nodes. Consequently, the
average delay to get transactions delivered is also increased
which, on the other hand, would affect the consistency of the
public ledger. On the other hand, maintaining clusters, which
are fully connected via master nodes and edge nodes, based
on physical internet proximity implies faster transaction
propagation in the MNBC protocol. In fact, contrary to what
previously thought in this area, we found that reconstructing
the Bitcoin network layout on proximity bases implies faster
transmissions.
Turning now to the comparison between MNBC protocol
and BCBSN Protocol. As shown in Fig.1, both proposed
protocols show relatively same variances of delays over
nodes 1,2,3,4,5 and 6. From node 7, variances of delays
in BCBSN protocol started climbing steadily and reached
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Figure 1: Comparison of the distribution of ∆tc,n measured
in the simulated Bitcoin protocol with MNBC protocol and
BCBSN Protocol simulation results.(dt in MNBC=25ms)
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Figure 2: Comparison of the distribution of ∆tc,n as mea-
sured in the simulated BCBPT protocol with three thresholds
(dt =30ms, 60ms, 90ms )
a peak over node 10 recording transaction propagation
delay nearly 18000ms.
On the other hand, the variances of delays were totally
improved in the MNBC protocol over the Bitcoin and
BCBSN protocol, especially at nodes 8,9, and 10. The most
likely cause of the higher variances of delays in the BCBSN
protocol is the fact that the information flow between clus-
ters in BCBSN protocol can only be maintained through
supers peers. This causes lack of transformation channels
between clusters which results in inefficient information
distribution over the network. The lack of connections be-
tween clusters in BCBSN protocol has been tackled in
MNBC protocol by considering the edge nodes technology
which adds an extra connection channels between cluster.
Therefore, faster information propagation has been achieved
in MNBC compared to BCBSN.
In MNBC, the comparison among three variances of
delays was done based on three different latency suggested
thresholds 30 ms, 60 ms, and 90 ms. Results that are shown
in Fig.2 reveal that the less latency distance threshold in
MNBC performs less variance of delays. The key reason of
variances of delays have been declined when the threshold
value is reduced is that the number of nodes at each cluster
is minimised due to the limited coverage of the physical
topology which is offered by dt.
5. Security Analysis
Eclipse attack: The proposed protocol ensures that
performing eclipse attack is challenging as the selection of
peers is carried out using combination of physical proximity
and random selection. However, increasing the number of
outgoing connection at each node would further improve the
resistance of the network against the eclipse attack.
Partition attack: We assume that the botnet is able to
also perform DDoS attacks on a limited number of peers in
the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network. According to our attack
model, the attack will be performed within three phases.
The first phase starts when several malicious nodes which
belong to an attacker join the peer-to peer Bitcoin network
and connect to many honest nodes. To ensure that attacker
nodes connect to as many honest nodes as possible, only IP
addresses of attacker nodes are announced by other attacker
nodes. Once the attacker guarantees that satisfied number
of connections to honest nodes were maintained and the
connectivity graph is thinned out, a proximate snapshot of
the network graph layout will be given by launching the
second scenario of the attack. This scenario can be achieved
through a probabilistic method which has been introduced
in [10]. By this method, the Bitcoin network topology can
be learnt with a reasonable probability through indicating
whether or not two peers in the network are connected by
sending marker addresses and observing the flow of these
addresses. By doing so, the attacker will be able to indicate
the minimum vertex cut of the network. Minimum vertex
cut is defined as minimum honest peers that removing them
causes splitting the graph into at least two partitions [11].
When the attacker selects peers for minimum vertex cut,
denial-of-service (DDOS) attack will be performed on the
selected peers. However, our partition attack evaluation will
be based on minimum vertex cut, as a metric to indicate
the cost of performing partition attacks. This metric has
been used in [12] to evaluate partition attacks in the Bitcoin
network protocol.
5.1. Experiment setup
We developed four experiment scenarios with differnt
network sizes (2000,4000,6000, and 8000). The size of the
attacking botnet was chosen to match the number of honest
peers in each scenarios. The first phase of the attack starts
when the network topology is restructured according to
each protocol of the proposed protocols. Specifically, several
attacker nodes join the network and start establishing con-
nections to many honest nodes. As we based our partition
attack evaluation on minimum vertex cut as a cost metric,
minimum vertex cut of the network topology is determined
at regular intervals using metis graph partition toolkits [13].
Metis algorithm can achieve a balance partitioning that
minimizes either the communication volume or number of
edge cut.
5.2. Results and discussions
Fig.3 shows the results of three simulated attacks on a
model of the real Bitcoin network, MNBC, and BCBSN pro-
tocol. Each attack was launched based on different network
sizes (2000,4000,6000, and 8000). The configuration of the
desired imbalance factor was done in a way that the largest
partitions does not include more than 60% of all nodes.
In the small scenarios with number of nodes (2,000 and
4,000), the number of honest peers in the minimum vertex
cut in all protocols after launching the partition attack stayed
below 500 which reveals that all protocols are relatively
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Number of Nodes
M
in
im
um
ve
rt
ex
C
ut
Bitcoin Protocol
MNBC Protoco
BCBSN protocol
Figure 3: Number of honest peers on the minimum vertex
cut
similar in terms of resistance against partition attacks. While
in the large scenarios with 6,000 and 8,000 peers, the level of
resistance against partition attacks increased in all protocols
as the number of nodes increases. The highest level of
resistance is experienced in the Bitcoin protocol, while the
lowest level is appeared in BCBSN protocol. Precisely,
the minimum vertex cut in the Bitcoin protocol increased
from around 500 to 3,800 with the scenario of 8,000 peers
resulting a notable gap in the minimum vertex cut between
the Bitcoin protocol and other protocols. Whereas, MNBC
protocol shows a higher resistance against partition attacks
over the BCBSN protocol, where the number of honest
nodes in the minimum vertex cut goes above 2,500 in the
scenario of 8,000 nodes. BCBSN protocol is considered
as the worst protocol of the proposed protocols in terms
of the ease of performing partition attacks as it showed
the lowest minimum vertex cut in both large and small
scenarios. Although the MNBC and BCBSN protocols show
less minimum vertex cut compared to the Bitcoin protocol,
the number of honest nodes required to cut in the proposed
protocols is still high which needs significant resources to
be considered. As expected, clusters in the MNBC that are
fully connected via master nodes and edge nodes reflect
less number of honest nodes in minimum vertex cut. While,
clusters in BCBSN that are connected via super peers result
in number of nodes in the area of minimum vertex cut going
down.
Fig.4 shows the results of the simulated partition attacks
on a model of the real Bitcoin network, MNBC, and BCBSN
protocol, captured within different session lengths. Within
24 hours of attack, the number of nodes in the minimum
vertex cut declined in the simulated real Bitcoin network
as well as the MNBC and BCBSN protocol as follows: the
minimum vertex cut declined from around 3,700 to 1,500
in the real Bitcoin network. The same scenario happened
in the MNBC where the minimum vertex cut decreased
0 6 12 18 24
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Time[h]
M
in
im
um
ve
rt
ex
C
ut
Bitcoin Protocol
MNBC protocol
BCBSN protocol
Figure 4: Number of non-attacker peers on the mini-
mum vertex cut during an attack with 7,000 honest peers
parametrized as in the real-world network, attacker’s session
length SA = 6h
from around 2500 to 1150. Similarly, minimum vertex cut
dropped down from 850 to 290 in the BCBSN protocol.
It can also be seen that the simulated real Bitcoin network
still performs better than the MNBC and BCBSN protocol in
terms of the resistance to partition attacks. However, it can
be concluded from the obtained results that more patience
from the attackers with a higher number of peers, the better
chances of success in splitting the network.
The simulation were performed with 7,000 honest peers
parametrized as in the real-world network, attacker’s session
length SA = 6h.
6. Conclusion
By conducting extensive simulations, MNBC evaluation
results indicate an improvement in the transaction propa-
gation delay over the Bitcoin network protocol. However,
MNBC maintains lower variance of delays over the BCBSN
protocol. Furthermore, evaluation of partitioning attacks in
the Bitcoin network as well as the MNBC and BCBSN
protocol was presented in this paper. Results revealed that
the Bitcoin network is more resistant against attackers than
the proposed protocols. However, attackers still need more
resources to split the network in the proposed protocols
especially with a higher number of nodes.
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